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Freedom, Order, and Complexity: Calhoun's
New Science of Politics and the New Science of Systems Michael C. Tuggle League of the South Papers No. 9 This paper is excerpted from Confederates in the Boardroom, which will be released in Summer, 2003 by Traveller Press, and is printed with the permission of the author and publisher. Central planners have always claimed their efforts benefit their target population. This assumes the population being managed is incapable of either choosing or implementing its best course of action. Without the genius of the central planners, the people would descend into chaos. As Thomas Hobbes assured us, central planners, by whatever name we call them, save mankind from an existence that would otherwise be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Hobbes was one of the earliest writers to apply the implications of the emerging mechanical worldview to political philosophy. The science of Hobbes' time insisted the world and its inhabitants were formless raw materials requiring expert social reengineers to impose order on them for their own good. Whatever flawed arrangements existed among its members prior to central planning obviously required reconstruction to achieve a more just, more equitable, more rational society. These inert, shapeless raw materials would respond only to mechanistic manipulation, which usually meant brute force. The legacy of mechanical science gave the world the now-discredited "Scientific Management" of industrial planner Frederick Taylor and the "Five-Year Plans" of Joseph Stalin, but its influence is with us still. Brute-force school administration put more than 200,000 American pre-schoolers on Ritalin for what industrial psychiatrists call "Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder," or what the pre-schoolers' grandparents would call "being kids." Brute-force management gave us "Dilbert," and its political equivalent pummeled its populations with everything from affirmative action to the Gulag; that is, from the ludicrous and merely annoying to the malignant. In recent decades, however, both central planning and the mechanical worldview that justified it have lost their practical and philosophical appeal. The emerging worldview, now widespread in business as well as in countless other fields, has replaced the mechanical, reductionist model with the organic and the relational. Whether the subject of study is a living thing, a society of living things, or a corporate re-organization, the new focus is on the sum of inter-relationships of its members rather than the isolated members themselves. Members linked together this way are not the simple machines behavioral scientists and social planners thought they were, and therefore cannot be controlled by simple instructions that have been imposed on them. They are not mechanical things subject to outside control, but richly inter-related (complex) systems whose networks of information flows enable original, even surprising, behavior. The new systems worldview accepts and respects the voluntary, natural order as well as the inborn character of its constituent components, whose natural interactions create that order, an order that is more durable and flexible than one imposed from the outside, no matter how many PhDs helped conceive it. The systems view teaches that all working systems succeed because they comprise smaller, self-organizing sub-systems that retain some degree of autonomy, which enables the overall system to remain adaptable and robust. This view not only restores respectability for the naturally occurring, traditional order, but philosophic legitimacy for local autonomy and decision-making. Two systems theorists who have considered the relationship between local autonomy and overall system stability and adaptability are Herbert A. Simon and W. Ross Ashby. Simon and Ashby are technicians attempting to solve the technical challenge of harmonizing management goals with the behavior of complex systems. (Simon's area of expertise is the design of administrative departments, while Ashby focuses on cybernetics, the study of biological and electro-mechanical control systems.) Both argue that local autonomy for subsystems is the key to overall system sustainability. Indeed, both stress that consolidating all the elements of a complex system into a uniform mass would destroy the creative interplay between the individual and the group, and between the sub-system and overall system, thus impairing the adaptability and vitality of the overall system. Their findings parallel the conclusions reached by notable political philosophers who preached the benefits of dispersed political authority. We shall summarize the work of Simon and Ashby, and then that of John Taylor of Caroline and John C. Calhoun. Both modern systems theorists and 19th century agrarian republicans contend that over-centralized systems are inherently unstable, unnatural, and ultimately destructive of the goals they ostensibly serve. Complex Systems Herbert A. Simon, a professor of psychology and computer science at Carnegie Mellon University, has written extensively on group decision making and organizational theory. In a paper considering how organizations coordinate their activities, Simon concludes that the organizations that are most successful at adapting to change also exhibit high levels of coordination. The organizational structure that facilitates both adaptability and high levels of coordination is one composed of semi-independent sub-units themselves composed of richly interrelated members. Simon's research in organizational structures suggests that these semi-independent sub-units enable an organization to reconfigure itself more quickly. Within those sub-units, people performing similar tasks will necessarily depend on frequent, rapid communication, while less dynamic connections will suffice among the different sub-units. Simon refers to such sub-units as "nearly decomposable," which means that each subsystem is largely independent of the short-run behavior of the other subsystems, and that each system pursues unique, but compatible, goals in its own particular way. Simon illustrates the versatility of the "nearly decomposable" system with an analogy to a watch-maker who has learned that assembling an entire watch piece by piece is a slow process susceptible to frequent interruptions. However, if the watchmaker instead constructs sub-assemblies that can later be joined with other sub-assemblies to make a functioning watch, he can recover much more easily from delays. Simon concludes that stable, intermediate subsystems are the key to an adaptive, and therefore more viable, complex system. The lesson of the watch-maker is also true of naturally occurring self-organizing systems. Attempts to reconstruct such a system piece by piece would be cumbersome, time-consuming, and inefficient. However, by allowing the sub-units (semi-autonomous departments, for example) to use their autonomy to learn how to find appropriate patterns of connectivity with other sub-units, they can develop a remarkable ability to find novel and increasingly progressive solutions to complicated problems. 1 Simon's studies demonstrate that imposing a top-down, rigid formula in the form of standard operating procedures to determine inter-departmental coordination could never approach the inherent flexibility and aptness of a self-organized approach. In reflecting on the universal success of near-decomposability as an organizational strategy in nature and in institutions, Simon notes the extreme difficulty of controlling the processes of an entire system. Because of the thousands of interconnections within each subsystem, and many more interconnections among the larger subsystems, a "bounded rationality" cannot comprehend the adjustments necessary to improve upon what the autonomous agents have done themselves. He compares an organization to a living body composed of independent organs, and concludes that a body could not function without subsystem independence. Simon notes that linear dependency among all subsystems within a living body would result in total system breakdown in the event of disruptions in a single subsystem. 2 The independence of sub-units, like the independence of organs in a body, does not mean there is no communication between sub-units. W. Ross Ashby maintains that complex systems are reducible, meaning that each component can still function on its own, while nevertheless operating within a greater system. If the whole system were systematically dismantled, or reduced, the component parts would still retain their distinctive capabilities. 3 Thus, a heart functions without interference or control from the skin or the stomach. Though ultimately dependent on each other, the various organs are functionally independent. They retain their distinct identity as separate organs. Further, Ashby argues, if a body or organization tried to constitute itself as one indistinguishable whole, every variable, such as breathing, moving, and thinking would affect every other variable. Opening your eyes might force a bowel movement, and thinking about breakfast could startle you into a fight or flight reaction. Such an organizational structure would make regulation impossible for an organized system, and life itself would be impossible. 4 In a playful essay entitled "Autonomy," Lewis Thomas raised a skeptical eyebrow at the idea of using electronic headsets to control one's own brain waves. Such things should be left to regulate themselves, he wrote, and he endorsed the principle of autonomy for constituent parts. Otherwise, he would undoubtedly mismanage his own body functions, and his own cells, indignant at his interference, would want to escape. 5 Instead, he decided, it's best to leave the sub-units alone because he admitted he had no idea how his sub-units perfomr their unique functions. His resolution to leave his body parts alone to manage their own affairs provides good advice to many CEOs, bureaucrats, and politicians, whose "bounded rationality" has been amply demonstrated, though still denied. Political implications of Systems Theory Actually, Dr. Thomas' thought experiment has been done in real life, and on a grand scale. The results were exactly what he anticipated. The Soviet experiment took Newtonian science to its logical conclusion as a scientific elite attempted to control every aspect of life to reconstruct a more rational, equitable society. Thousands of "cells" did indeed resent the vanguard's attempts to manage everything, and did try to escape, necessitating the Iron Curtain to hold them in. Not only did the "New Soviet Man" fail to evolve, both the economy and Russian society suffered immeasurably, and today, more than a decade after the Soviet Union's fall, neither has yet to recover. The explanation for the Soviet Union's demise cannot single out the triumph of the market as a complete explanation. Russia has the free market today, and is still a basket case. A more convincing rationale for the failure of the Soviet Union comes from our new understanding of the limitations of knowledge and centralized control. No central planner, no matter how robust his central computer or how absolute his power to enforce his dictates, can long disregard the nature of that which he wants to control. Such a central planner faces an impossible task, and will eventually diminish or kill his subject. Herbert Simon pronounced the ambition as doomed from the start, because an overall optimal solution, despite Frederick Taylor's assertions, simply does not exist. 6 Better, Simon argues, to allow the sub-units to work out a "satisfactory" solution, which at the very least is possible. The best, in business as in politics, is indeed the enemy of the good. When centralizing regimes usurp the authority of existing autonomous states, they not only crush the freedom necessary for free and open communication and creativity, they invariably crush those who stand in their way. Indeed, despite the constant threats that centralizing governments frighten their populations with in order to justify their power, no single threat is as deadly as government without localized counterweights to protect its members. R.J. Rummel, a professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, and author of Death by Government, estimates that governments have murdered 170 million of their own people. What enabled Stalin, Mao, and Hitler to engineer the mass murders of their own people was the eradication of the traditional institutions that historically protect individuals. The regimes of 20th century dictators actively destroyed the sources of dispersed power, including local principalities, churches, and the nobility. Of course, the local centers of power had to be eliminated under the guise of "liberating" the people from the old order, who could never have attempted the mass murders of the dictators because of competing local centers of power. One objection to this indictment of centralized government is that the fault of the mass executions belongs only to the dictators who perverted what was supposed to be a liberation movement into a personal quest for power. However, the centralization of power cannot be dismissed as a regrettable side effect when those who put those dictators in power openly supported the deliberate destruction of all local self-government. The revolutions the dictators led openly aimed at a radical reconstruction of society, and its other leaders, including those who were later eliminated as potential rivals, concurred that competing centers of power had to be swept away for the revolution to achieve its goals. Further, the worldviews supporting these power grabs identified centralized power exercised by an educated elite as necessary preconditions for the realization of their stated goals. The chaos and bloodshed left in the wake of those who intend to assimilate and unify cannot be dismissed as accidents; they are the inevitable result of their methods. By their deliberate destruction of naturally arising, dispersed centers of local authority, the centralizers create disorder they then use to justify even greater power for themselves. As Edmund Burke noted, a "vast network of relationships among men" that had built up through many generations constituted the "ties of nature, which are the laws of God." These networks of inter-relationships, having been built up spontaneously over time, created the traditional social order. Once forcibly broken, the natural harmony of the targeted society has been lost. This is why Russia still cannot get its economy and society functioning again. Further, the order that suits one culture may seem dictatorial and cruel to another. Thus, one culture's set of mutual expectations and obligations from one's neighbors and government, what we refer to as rights, will differ among the various cultures just as customs and values will differ. This corresponds to Herbert Simon's insistence that different administrative departments should be allowed to evolve their own ways of doing things. The imposition of standardized operating procedures, like "universal rights", are so abstract and therefore inappropriate that they can only disrupt the natural network of inter-relationships, and chaos can be the only result. Such interference will break down the connections, or communication lines, as well as the natural and shared behavioral expectations, among members. Because culture reflects the countless messages that the outside observer could never perceive, the native participant in a culture experiences it at a profound level the outsider never can. More important, the harmony achieved within a culture arises out of interaction that even the participants are not fully aware of, and is therefore more stable and durable than an attempt at harmony hammered out among members of disparate cultures. Such attempts are necessarily restricted to the purely legalistic; that is; logical, which, while an important part of any culture, remains only a part unable to bear the weight of a whole culture. The emotional involvement that people naturally invest in their daily relations cannot be formularized.
One political commentator who appreciated the link between a society's organic order and the type of government it produced was John Taylor of Caroline County, Virginia. A successful planter, legislator, and writer, Taylor, who died in 1824, sought to warn his fellow citizens and legislators about the threat of centralized power and the monied interests it promoted. What made this alliance so threatening to the young republic's fragile political and social institutions was its deceptive use of democratic language to dress up its actions. Americans, according to Taylor, believed the Constitution fully protected their rights and way of life, so government's promise to advance the cause of democracy seemed beneficial. Equally ominous, said Taylor, was the ease with which the monied interests and their friends in Washington DC accused opponents of anti-Americanism. In Congress, Taylor opposed a central bank, protective tariffs, and subsidies to business because he felt such measures would lead to an American aristocracy of wealth just as oppressive as the British one. Worse, the imposition of the rule of a monied elite would disrupt the natural harmony that Taylor believed existed among men. An organic community based on agricultural labor fostered fellow feeling and affection between neighbors. An artificial social order imposed by a government that had exceeded its constitutional limits, Taylor feared, would be based on political and commercial scheming and exploitation. Such a government, he warned, would "produce a dissolution of manners dangerous to property and liberty." In other words, an artificial order based on speculation and political privilege would change people's behavior, and disrupt the natural relationships between individuals that made a community function harmoniously and humanely. Overcentralized government, fueled by greed and ambition, would violate the natural order and inevitably weaken or destroy the political rights that grew out of an organic order. History has proven John C. Calhoun of South Carolina to have been one of the most prescient political writers, both in his anticipation of the consequences of centralized power, and of the systems theory of government. His A Disquisition On Government, published in 1853, summarizes his political thought. Calhoun's premises and conclusions clash almost point-by-point with Hobbes. For example, while Hobbes assumed that men possessed no inherent interrelatedness or self-discipline, Calhoun saw man as a social being who needed the cooperation and assistance of others, and therefore naturally created government "to preserve and protect society." 7 Calhoun also differed from Locke in believing that government is not, as Locke would maintain, a mechanism crafted out of enlightened self-interest. To Calhoun, government arose naturally and spontaneously among men: "There is no difficulty in forming government. It is not even a matter of choice, whether there shall be one or not. Like breathing, it is not permitted to depend on our volition." While reason certainly contributed to the proper operation of government, said Calhoun, it could not pretend to have invented the practice. Man's social nature, according to Calhoun, made government a natural, inevitable, feature of the human condition: "…man is so constituted as to be a social being. His inclinations and wants, physical and moral, irresistibly impel him to associate with his kind; and he has, accordingly, never been found, in any age or country, in any state other than the social. In no other, indeed, could he exist; and in no other--were it possible for him to exist--could he attain to a full development of his moral and intellectual faculties, or raise himself, in the scale of being, much above the level of the brute creation." Society, to Calhoun, came first, and it was government's role to conform to the disposition of the people whom government served. One mode of government could never fit all peoples and all situations: "…the human race is not comprehended in a single society or community. The limited reason and faculties of man, the great diversity of language, customs, pursuits, situation and complexion, and the difficulty of intercourse, with various other causes, have, by their operation, formed a great many separate communities, acting independently of each other." Further, Calhoun noted that the aim of government is not to achieve perfection, but to achieve a balance between order and freedom. Clearly, Calhoun would have agreed that politics, at its best, exhibits bounded chaos. It is also apparent that he would agree with Herbert A. Simon that each sub-system or department in an organized system should "satisfice", 8 that is, select a reasonably good solution, rather than insisting on an unrealistic, ideal standard. Calhoun understood that an endless pursuit of perfection would give the unscrupulous the excuse they desired to expand the powers of government. The ever-present danger, he believed, was government's propensity for abusing its power and exploiting its people. Calhoun outlined his vision of how the American Constitution was crafted to respond to both the need for a government vigorous enough to protect society, and yet still remain under the reliable control of the people. He argued that a constitution that allows both input into the creation of new laws and a veto protecting a minority from exploitation, plus the right to vote, provided the necessary safeguards from oppressive government. This structure, Calhoun believed, ensured that each section and its interests would be properly represented. Calhoun understood that the health of the overall system of government depended on the health of its parts. The parts had to retain not only their unique goals, values, and culture, but also their influence if they were to contribute to the decision-making capabilities of the overall system. Indeed, in a passage remarkably similar to Ashby's speculations on the chaos that would result if a living body attempted to consolidate its independent sub-systems, Calhoun recognized that no single man could competently control others: "For each, at the same moment, intensely participating in all the conflicting emotions of those around him, would, of course, forget himself and all that concerned him immediately, in his officious intermeddling with the affairs of all others; which, from his limited reason and faculties, he could neither properly understand nor manage. Such a state of things would, as far as we can see, lead to endless disorder and confusion, not less destructive to our race than a state of anarchy." To maintain the proper balance between the whole and its parts, it is necessary, said Calhoun, to gather information from the various parts before making vital decisions. To obtain feedback on how it's doing, the whole, or overall system must first "take the sense of the community" by taking "the sense of all its parts." This process allows for a freer, richer level of communication among the parts, making legislation of both higher quality and greater acceptability. Consolidated governments, according to Calhoun, do not have these advantages. Minority voices, silenced by a triumphant majority, can no longer refresh the system with divergent views. In place of compromise, where the insights of several minds attack the problem as they also accommodate each other's views and interests, a consolidated government centralizes decision making as well: "All absolute governments concentrate power in one uncontrollable and irresponsible individual or body" -- what Herbert Simon would describe as "the bounded rationality" of centralized control. Lacking the richness of communication from each local area coming into the process, and sabotaging the goodwill and increased loyalty from a dispersed decision-making process, a consolidated government sets itself on a dead-end course. Calhoun believed that just as individuals maintain, and perfect, their separate existence within society, the separate States that composed the United States also possessed separate, distinct identities and values. Calhoun's description of the voluntary Union that created the United States reflects the composition of a complex system, in which each member retains its inherent characteristics and capabilities within a greater complex system. Calhoun recognized and approved the existence of redundant "powers of government" within each of the constituent components of the United States: "Each was framed by written constitutions; those of the several States by the people of each, acting separately, and in their sovereign character; and that of the United States, by the same, acting in the same character,--but jointly instead of separately. All were formed on the same model. They all divide the powers of government into legislative, executive, and judicial; and are founded on the great principle of the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled. The entire powers of government are divided between the two; those of a more general character being specifically delegated to the United States; and all others not delegated, being reserved to the several States in their separate character. Each, within its appropriate sphere, possesses all the attributes, and performs all the functions of government. Neither is perfect without the other. The two combined, form one entire and perfect government." Neither John Taylor of Caroline nor John Calhoun desired to stop industrialization, or to prevent change. Indeed, they spoke of progress as a naturally desirable goal for individuals and society. Both recognized industry and commerce as vital components of the modern state, but wanted to protect agriculture's preeminent role as the most stable and humane foundation for the economic and political system. Beneficial change, agreed to through cooperation and compromise, should maintain the best features of the existing system and allow them to adapt to changing circumstances. However, both men faced down opponents who dressed up their goals of centralization and consolidation with democratic, progressive language. John Taylor and John Calhoun sought to preserve the uniqueness and character of the independent social orders, states, and institutions that contributed to the long-term vitality of constitutional government. Decentralized control, then, not only protects human rights, but also contributes to social and political harmony, as well as to overall efficiency. In government, as in all organizations, decentralization plays a vital role in maintaining genuine order and enabling local knowledge to deal with local expectations, goals, and problems. Michael C. Tuggle
7. All quotes are from The Essential Calhoun: Selections from Writings, Speeches, and Letters, edited by Clyde Wilson New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1992. 8. Simon Administrative Behavior , p. 118.
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